David Blaine

I watched this TeD video where the magician David Blaine explains how he broke the Guiness record of apnea by staying a little more than 17 minutes under water.

To me, this guy is more than a magician, and more than an athlete, he's a pure artist. His determination to push the human body beyond its clinical limits is of course very spectacular and impressive, but it also says something about what it means to live. How much can one deprave the body from resources (food, oxygen) and still survive? There is also a sense of askesis very similar to what one can find in several religious traditions (fast, meditation, etc.)...

However, what struck me particularly was the fact that after a failed attempt he finally broke the record (live on TV) when he was convinced that he had no chance to succeed since his heartbeat was unusually high during the immersion. I think there might be some universal truth in this: great things are often achieved just at the moment when a long chain of intense efforts oriented to a precise goal ultimately gives way to the disappearance of all hope.

Nirmali

II. The twofold task in working out the question of Being. Method and design of our investigation

This is a summary of Heidegger's second introduction to Being and Time.

5. The ontological analytic of Dasein as laying bare of the horizon for an interpretation of the meaning of Being in general.

Dasein is a tricky thing to analyse in that it is in some respect obvious to us and in some other obscure. MH writes that "Dasein is ontically 'closest' to itself and ontologically farthest; but pre-ontologically it is surely not a stranger." As regard to its existence, we understand it immediately since "we are it". But "in spite of this, or rather for just this reason", it is the most difficult thing to really understand in its essence, because we are naturally inclined to consider it as obvious, self-evident. However, intuitively we have some sort of embryonic understanding of its essence since "Dasein is in such a way as to be something which understands something like Being". To perform an analytic of Dasein we must "choose such a way of access and such a kind of interpretation that this entity can show itself in itself and from itself".

MH announces that "we shall point to temporality as the meaning of the Being of that entity which we call "Dasein"," and that "we shall show that whenever Dasein tacitly understands and interprets something like Being, it does so with time as its standpoint". And in consequence, "time needs to be explicated primordially as the horizon for the understanding of Being, and in terms of temporality as the Being of Dasein, which understands Being." But the conception of time required will have to depart from the ordinary understanding of time (in particular time as a "criterion for naively discriminating various realms of entities", such as temporal, non-temporal, 'supra-temporal' eternal entities...).

"The central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time, if rightly seen and rightly explained".

6. The task of destroying the history of ontology

Dasein's own past "is not something which follows along after Dasein, but something which already goes ahead of it" (Dasein "is its past"). This has the perverse effect that Dasein "falls prey to the tradition of which it has more or less explicitly taken hold. This tradition keeps him from providing its own guidance, whether inquiring or in choosing". And this also holds true for ontological understanding. Tradition "becomes master" and conceals itself. "It blocks our access to those primordial 'sources' from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part quire genuinely drawn". The Greek ontology has thus "deteriorated to a tradition in which it gets reduced to something self-evident". Then "in the Middle Ages this uprooted Greek ontology became a fixed body of doctrine". Subsequent concepts such as "the ego cogito of Descartes, the subject, the "I", reason, spirit, person" (...) "all remain uninterrogated as to their Being". Just like in certain oriental philosophies, the primordial clarity of mind has deteriorated throughout history into rigidified clichés.

Our task is clear: "we are to destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology". AC/DC man! But nihilist enthusiasm is inappropriate: this destruction is "far from having the negative sense of shaking off the ontological tradition" (or "bury the past in nullity"). "We must, on the contrary, stake out the positive possibilities of that tradition, and this always means keeping it within its limits".

The point of departure for the task of destroying the problematic of Temporality will be the Kantian doctrine of time. After all, Kant is "the first and only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards investigating the dimension of Temporality". Still he didn't go very far because he "took over Descartes' position quite dogmatically". And Descartes, with his radical discovery of the 'cogito sum', left undetermined the meaning of the Being of the 'sum'. He "is 'dependent' upon medieval scholasticism". Furthermore, "Kant's basic ontological orientation remains that of the Greeks", and more precisely that of Aristotle.

In summary, the strategy is clear: in order to concretely address the question of Being with time as a horizon we must first destroy the associated tradition "until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being".

7. The phenomenological method of investigation

"AdS/CFT from F-theory?"

At the lunch group meeting James told us about a fairly recent paper by Polchinski and Silverstein, entitled Dual Purpose Landscaping Tools: Small Extra Dimensions in AdS/CFT. Their goal is to construct vacua of string or M-theory with minimal supersymmetry of the form $AdS_d \times \text{small}$, where small means that the internal space is small compared to the AdS radius. The problem is that in the case of the standard Freund-Rubin backgrounds (whose dual CFTs are rather well understood in terms of the near-horizon limit of D3- or M2-branes at the tip of a Calabi-Yau cone), the radius of the internal space is of the same size as the AdS radius.

The new idea is to add some D7-branes. These contribute to the potential energy with an opposite sign to the curvature of the internal manifold, and so could be chosen such that the resulting cosmological constant is small.

This is where F-theory comes into play. The construction there is to glue IIB solutions using the $SL(2,\mathbb{Z})$ duality symmetry, and to allow for D7-branes. A D7-brane, which is codimension two and thus can be surrounded by a circle, is a unit magnetic source for the axion $C_0$ (a periodic RR scalar field): \[\int_{S^1} d C_0 =1~.\] The axion combines with the dilaton $\phi$in a complex field in the upper half-plane \[\tau = C_0 + i e^{-\phi} = C_0 +\frac{i}{g_s}~.\] $C_0$ has monodromy one around the D7-brane, meaning that going around the circle transforms it as $C_0 \to C_0 +1$.

Now splitting the 10d metric as a 4d Minkowski space-time times a 6d manifold $B$ and requiring $\mathcal{N}=1$ susy in 4d implies that $B$ is a Kaehler manifold and that $\tau$ is (anti-)holomorphic: $\bar\partial \tau =0$.

Mathematically, specifying the modular parameter $\tau$ in the fundamental region is equivalent to specifying an elliptic curve, and so this whole construction can be seen as an elliptic fibration $\pi: X\to B$, with $X$ a four complex dimensional manifold. The fibre over a point $p\in B$ on the base is an elliptic curve $E_{\tau}$ that is "biholomorphically" equivalent to a torus determined by a lattice $(1,\tau)$:
\[\pi^{-1} (p) \cong E_{\tau} \cong \mathbb{C}/(1,\tau)~.\]
What is very nice is that the D7-branes are located where the elliptic fibration degenerates, i.e. where the torus gets pinched off and becomes singular.
James made the point that this is not just a mathematical construction since one can T-dualise to IIA and the lift to M-theory, where the resulting solution is the product of a 3d Minkowski space-time and a CY four-fold. Polchinski and Silverstein's idea is to get $AdS_5 \times \text{small}$ solutions by looking at CY four-fold cones that are elliptically fibered...

Etymology of yo

Today, I think I made an etymological breakthrough: the interjection "yo", at least in some of its acceptations, is none other than the contraction of "you know". Word up!

"Gauge/gravity in three dimensions"

Today's Theoretical Particle Physics seminar was given by Diego Rodriguez-Gomez (Queen Mary, U. of London), based mainly on 0809.3237 and 0903.3231.

Given the broad audience, he started by a small review of the AdS/CFT correspondence as a specially clean incarnation of 't Hooft's and Susskind's holographic principle. Whereas the 4d case has been relatively well understood for some time, the 3d case began to reveal itself only recently. In fact, until roughly two years ago, it was thought that the IR fixed point at the end of the RG flow of the maximally supersymmetric $\mathcal{N}=8$ SYM in 3d had no Lagrangian description. The reason for this belief was that the dual description has a non-constant dilaton blowing up at small radius: $e^{\phi} =(R/r)^{5/4}$. The BLG theory (anticipated by Schwarz) was an $\mathcal{N}=8$ Chern-Simons-like theory but it had an $SU(2)$ gauge group instead of the large $N$ needed in the AdS/CFT context. The resolution came from relaxing the requirement of maximal susy down to $\mathcal{N}=6$, which allowed arbitrary $N$ [ABJM].

Diego was interested in reducing the supersymmetry to $\mathcal{N}=2$ by putting the M2-branes at the tip of a Calabi-Yau four-fold. He focused on a specific example: the cone over $Q^{1,1,1}$, which is similar to the conifold in 6d and has the advantage to have been extensively studied (the metric is explicitly known). The simplest proposal (inspired by crystal models) is that the dual field theory is a quiver with four gauge groups, six fields, and a sextic superpotential $W$ with two terms. As in the ABJM case, all the global symmetries are not manifest, but appear by studying how scalar fields get identified. This results in a mesonic moduli space that is an $\mathcal{N}=2$ orbifold $Q^{1,1,1}/\mathbb{Z}_2$. Here are the toric diagram and the associated quiver:
Diego and his collaborators were able to show that the chiral operator spectrum is matching the supergravity harmonics, at least at large CS level $k$. This is a non-trivial check of the non-Abelian superpotential $W= C_1 A_1 B_1 C_2 A_2B_2 - C_1 A_1 B_2 C_2 A_2B_1$.

Remaining mysteries include the question of whether theories with $\mathcal{N}<3$ susy are conformal, which would require to have an equivalent in 3d of a-maximization; the inverse algorithm (from the CY4 to the quiver) and the connection to type IIA string theory; the small $k$ limit and monopoles operators, which is the genuinely M-theoretic limit, since at large $k$ the theory reduces to IIA.

I. The necessity, structure, and priority of the question of Being

This is a summary of the first section of the Introduction of Martin Heidegger's major work, Being and Time (1926), where he is aiming at reawakening an understanding of the meaning of the question of Being.

I. THE NECESSITY, STRUCTURE, AND PRIORITY OF THE QUESTION OF BEING

1. The Necessity for Explicitly Restating the Question of Being

Since Plato and Aristotle the question of Being has been trivialized, and hence considered as superfluous. MH lists three prejudices, according to which this question is unnecessary. First, the assertion that 'Being' is the most universal concept does not imply that it is also the clearest: "It is rather the darkest of all." Secondly, even though 'Being' cannot be defined -- since a definition is typically of the form "something is this and that", it presupposes an understanding of the word "is" -- this does not eliminate the question of its meaning. Thirdly, the "self-evident" character of the concept of 'Being' remains, a priori, an enigma. So not only does the question of Being lack a clear answer, but "the question itself is obscure and without direction".

2. The Formal Structure of the Question of Being

The structure of any question splits into: that which is asked about [sein Gefragtes], the starting point of the curiosity; that which is interrogated [sein Befragtes], the things one turns to in order to find an answer; and that which is to be found out by asking [das Erfragte], the answer itself.

In the case of the question of Being, the Gefragtes is... Being [damn! I knew it], or more explicitly "that which determines entities as entities". But "the Being of entities 'is' not itself an entity", in the sense explained above that Being cannot be defined. Rather, Being "must be exhibited in a way of its own" (quite intriguing ain't it?). [I'll hereinafter push the acronym perversity so far as to reduce Being to B.]

The Befragtes are the entities themselves, that is "everything we talk about, everything we have in view, everything towards which we comport ourselves in any way" (a rather broad concept, mind you). [As an aside, I find such periphrases very revealing of the superiority of the German language to forge concepts.] But in sight of the unlimited possible choice, can one single out a specific entity that will be particularly useful to discern the meaning of B? Well we can, and it is ourselves, the inquirers. MH calls this special entity the "Dasein": "This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being". What singles us out, among the infinities of entities, is the very fact that we are able to grow an interest in that which determines us as entities, i.e. our B.

There is an apparent danger of 'circular reasoning': are we supposed to come to grip with the meaning of B by inquiring into entities that are inquiring into their own B by inquiring into entities that are inquiring into their own B by inquiring--you got it--? MH discards this "always sterile" argument, since (if I understand correctly) it is fine to 'presuppose' B "provisionally". No circular reasoning then, but "a remarkable 'relatedness backward and forward' " between the Gefragtes (B) and the Befragtes (us, Dasein). [This is somewhat reminiscent of self-consistent systems in condensed matter theory.]

3. Ontological Priority of the Question of Being

The message of this subsection is basically that "Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, it if has not firstly clarified the meaning of B, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task". What MH means (supposedly) is that among all the scientific investigations, the question of B is the most primordial. But I suspect that he doesn't mean "priority" in the sense that it has to come first. Indeed, in any of the fields of scientific research (or "areas of subject-matter"), the "basic concepts" are (provisionally, "beforehand") "worked out after a fashion in our pre-scientific ways of experiencing...". So the subject-matter of interest is primitively understood, may I say, intuitively, and it is over this original intuition that a science, that is a "system of categories", develops. But:

"The 'real' movement of the sciences takes place when their basic concepts undergo a more or less radical revision which is transparent to itself. The level which a science has reached is determined by how far it is capable of a crisis in its basic concepts." (p.9)

[Remark: I have a similar approach to evaluate the richness of a personality.] And MH to enumerate a few instances in science of what he perceives as "freshly awakened tendencies to put research on new foundations": the foundational crisis in mathematics, in spite of it being "seemingly the most rigorous and most firmly constructed of the sciences" (a clear presentiment of Goedel's incompleteness theorem of 1931); the "problem of matter" in the context of the relativity theory of physics (I don't understand his point at all, even at the seventeenth reading...); the "new kind of B" defined in biology; and the realisation of the "inadequate" foundation of theology (he's probably being polite).

Ontological (concerned primarily with B) inquiries, such as Kant's Critique of the Pure Reason, are "more primordial" than the ontical (concerned primarily with entities) inquiry of the positive sciences. But they still lack an understanding of 'what we really mean by this expression "Being" '.

4. The Ontical Priority of the Question of Being

I find this last section more difficult to understand, perhaps because MH "anticipate[s] later analyses". Here we see listed and swiftly defined a series of key Heideggerian mottos and concepts. For instance, about Dasein, he is writing that "Being is an issue for it" and that

"Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological."

The distinction between "existentiell" and "existential" is also briefly described. As far as I can tell, the former means what you would naively expect, namely it characterises an understanding of existence, and more precisely Dasein's own existence.

"Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence--in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself."

(Here one can foresee the concept of authenticity.) MH underlines that Dasein is responsible for its existence, either actively or passively (for example, I suppose, if it lets external circumstances like childhood trauma dictate its conduct).

"Only the particular Dasein decides its existence, whether it does so by taking hold or by neglecting."

"Existential" on the other side characterises an understanding of the context of the "structure of existence".

"By "existentiality" we understand the state of Being that is constitutive for those entities that exist."

Coming back to the ideas of the previous section, MH writes that "Sciences are ways of Being in which Dasein comports itself towards entities which it needs not be itself", but his message is that Dasein "must first be interrogated ontologically." And just like the basic concepts of sciences are first worked out in a pre-scientific way, the question of B has to be worked out in a pre-ontological way:

"the question of Being is nothing other that the radicalization of an essential tendency-of-Being which belongs to Dasein itself--the pre-ontological understanding of Being."

This is the end of the first introduction of Being and Time.

I mean come on! How amazing is that? The guy is slowly cracking the very kernel of the most fundamental question you can imagine, the question of Being. Heidegger was saying in an interview that an entirely new form of thought is now called for, in our modern time. It is simpler than the old way of thinking, more natural, but it is also more difficult, in that it requires a much greater care with the use of language. This perspective should be motivation enough to overcome the disgust inspired by the bestiary of Heideggerian concepts. So let's keep calm and carry on!